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THICK LAW, THIN JUSTICE
Patrick Macklem*
The Thin Justice of International Law: A Moral Reckoning
of the Law of Nations. By Steven R. Ratner. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 2015. P. 434. $85.
Introduction
In his masterful book, The Thin Justice of International Law: A Moral
Reckoning of the Law of Nations, Steven Ratner1 argues that the justice of
legal norms that constitute our international legal order should be deter-
mined according to two criteria: the degree to which these norms causally
bring about international and intrastate peace, and the degree to which they
causally bring about a state of affairs in which basic human rights are
respected. These two criteria are not merely what abstract moral theory de-
mands of international law as a matter of global justice. They are drawn
from foundational pillars of our existing international legal order: interna-
tional law’s commitments to international and interstate peace, and respect
for human rights.
These two criteria of global justice operate as a screen that filters inter-
national legal norms according to the degree to which they merit the mantle
of justice, in the following way. A legal norm, say, a prohibition of humani-
tarian intervention in the absence of authorization by the UN Security
Council, is just if it contributes to a state of affairs in which peace is ad-
vanced and respects human rights. If the norm does not advance peace, it
will only be just if it is needed to create a state of affairs characterized by
respect for human rights. Ratner defends this screen in terms of rule conse-
quentialism by positioning himself as “asking whether various rules or alter-
natives to them, if followed by the actors to whom they are directed, would
be reasonably expected to lead to certain states of affairs defined in terms of
peace and human rights” (p. 83).
The Thin Justice of International Law thus offers a thin, and nonideal,
theory of global justice. It is thin because, drawing from Michael Walzer, the
criteria on which its theory is constructed constitute “a ‘moral minimum’—
universal in scope, reflecting values shared across cultures that are a baseline
from which thicker, community-based morality may be developed.”2 And it
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is nonideal, because the criteria are drawn from key features of existing in-
ternational law to form a blueprint for determining the justice of the thick
legal norms that structure global politics into an international legal order.
The publication of The Thin Justice of International Law comes in the
midst of an explosion of scholarly interest in global justice. Much of this
scholarship is located in debates within moral and political philosophy. With
notable exceptions,3 these debates have had little time for questions relating
to the justice of the detailed international legal norms that comprise our
international legal order. For their part, international legal scholars, again
with notable exceptions,4 tend to view abstract questions about a just global
order as peripheral matters of moral and political theory that do not engage
with issues that arise in international legal theory and practice. The Thin
Justice of International Law is a timely and significant intervention in such a
context, linking concrete international legal rules to abstract theoretical de-
bates about global justice by means of a metric—a metric grounded in no-
nideal theory that also aspires to determine the contours of a globally just
international legal order.
This Review advances three claims about The Thin Justice of Interna-
tional Law. First, the theory of global justice it presents is more rule conse-
quentialist than it appears. This is because Ratner does not restrict rule
consequentialism to the screening of legal norms. Consequentialism also
leaks into the justification he offers for the criteria he provides for determin-
ing the global justice of legal norms. According to Ratner, “consequentialist
reasoning places the preservation of interstate and internal peace as the first
principle of global justice precisely because peace is the linchpin to advanc-
ing the welfare and overall flourishing of individuals” (p. 96). The second
pillar of global justice—respect for human rights—“is based upon putting
the individual’s basic rights first in situations where the advancement of
peace may conflict with those rights” (p. 96). As a result, the criteria become
3. See pp. 31–32. For exceptions, see Charles R. Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights
(2009); David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to
Cosmopolitan Governance (1995); Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Global-
ization (2002); Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, National-
ism, and Patriotism (2004); Joshua Cohen, Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We
Can Hope For?, 12 J. Pol. Phil. 190 (2004); Robert E. Goodin, What Is So Special About Our
Fellow Countrymen?, 98 Ethics 663 (1988); Thomas Mertens, Defending the Rawlsian League
of Peoples: A Critical Comment on Tan, 18 Leiden J. Int’l L. 711 (2005); and Terry Nardin,
Legal Positivism as a Theory of International Society, in International Society: Diverse Eth-
ical Perspectives 17 (David R. Mapel & Terry Nardin eds., 1998).
4. See pp. 25–27. For exceptions, see Philip Allott, Eunomia: New Order for a
New World (1990); Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institu-
tions (1995); Brad R. Roth, Sovereign Equality and Moral Disagreement: Premises of
a Pluralist International Order (2011); Fernando R. Tesón, Humanitarian Interven-
tion: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (3d ed. 2005); Frank J. Garcia, Global Justice and
the Bretton Woods Institutions, 10 J. Int’l Econ. L. 461 (2007); John Tasioulas, International
Law and the Limits of Fairness, 13 Eur. J. Int’l L. 993 (2002); and Gerry J. Simpson, Is Interna-
tional Law Fair?, 17 Mich. J. Int’l L. 615 (1996) (reviewing Franck, supra).
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rules consequentially derived from—and instrumentally serve—the funda-
mental values of human welfare and human flourishing. This raises the pos-
sibility of either a third pillar that directly promotes these values or a list of
human rights that includes rights that more directly protect interests associ-
ated with these values.
Second, The Thin Justice of International Law produces a thick, just in-
ternational legal order. Its thin global justice criteria result in consistency
between much of the existing international legal system and a just interna-
tional legal order. This is due, in no small measure, to the fact that the legal
norms that constitute the international legal entitlement of sovereignty are
held constant in the calculus. Sovereignty itself, as a legal entitlement that
the international legal order distributes to some geographically concentrated
collectivities in the world and not others, is not interrogated in terms of its
relationship to peace and human rights. This distribution—its origins, the
episodic recalibrations to which it is subject, and its distributional conse-
quences—forms the heart of our international legal order; it is the primary
way by which international law provides legal order to global politics. Treat-
ing it as “a fixed attribute of the international order,” as The Thin Justice of
International Law does, means that fundamental questions relating to the
justice of this distribution remain outside the normative sphere of global
justice (p. 86). But a third pillar consequentially derived from the values of
human welfare and flourishing would enable scrutiny of some of the adverse
consequences of the distribution of sovereign power in international law.
Third, The Thin Justice of International Law explicitly rests in part on a
political conception of human rights, where human rights are defined in
terms of their practical function in global political discourse. On this con-
ception, global human rights discourse is a social practice whose partici-
pants invoke or rely on human rights as reasons for certain kinds of actions
in certain circumstances. What this practice reveals is that human rights
protect urgent individual interests against certain predictable dangers associ-
ated with the exercise of sovereign power. Such a political conception of
human rights rests on a species of originalism that attributes significance to
the intentions of political actors producing and reproducing the practice at
hand. Relying on practice to identify the normative dimensions of human
rights—that is, the role they should play in the international arena—also
risks conflating fact and norm, and potentially drains human rights of their
capacity to act as instruments of critique of existing practices. And relying
on a political account risks relegating some human rights to the sidelines,
such as the right to development, because they do not act as reasons that
justify the exercise of sovereign power, even though they serve as reasons to
mitigate the distribution of sovereign power that international law performs
to structure global politics into an international legal order. But if the pillar
of respect for human rights is expanded to include rights that protect inter-
ests associated with human welfare and human flourishing—specifically the
human right to development—then this pillar can assess the justice of the
role that international law’s foundational commitment to sovereignty plays
in the production and reproduction of global economic inequality.
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I. Thin Justice and Rule Consequentialism
Ratner’s standard of global justice comprises two principles or pillars,
both of which provide international legal actors with prescriptions and
prohibitions for and against certain kinds of action: peace, whereby interna-
tional actors advance international and intrastate peace; and basic human
rights, whereby international actors should respect basic human rights (p.
65). Ratner defines both pillars as referencing particular states of affairs. Ac-
cordingly, the first pillar has as its objective a state of affairs in which peace
is advanced, whereas the second pillar prescribes a state of affairs in which
basic human rights are respected (pp. 66, 80).
Ratner describes this part of his project in terms of rule consequential-
ism, by indicating that he is asking whether extant legal norms, if followed,
will lead to certain states of affairs defined in terms of peace and human
rights (p. 83). But he does not clearly define what he means by consequen-
tialism. On occasion, he seems to use the terms “consequentialism” and
“utilitarianism” interchangeably, even though utilitarianism is but one spe-
cies of consequentialism.5 Elsewhere, he appears to apply the label of “conse-
quentialist” to any moral view that happens to take consequences into
account. For instance, he writes that “[u]nder [the first] pillar, the relation-
ship of international law to justice is seen in consequentialist terms; we judge
the justice of international law norms by their consequences in terms of
their contribution to international and interstate peace” (p. 66). Ratner’s
approach differs from classical utilitarianism; it does not require actual con-
sequentialism, where the morality of an act depends upon its actual conse-
quences. And although Ratner ostensibly endorses a version of evaluative
consequentialism, where the moral rightness of an act depends only on the
value of its consequences, he nonetheless seems to reject a simply additive
approach to value.6
5. When talking about impartial moral frameworks, Ratner introduces the notion of
utilitarianism, which he describes as providing “principles of justice based on the idea of maxi-
mizing total individual welfare.” P. 57. He then switches gears to talk about consequentialism
more generally. See p. 62. Elsewhere, he writes that “[c]onsequentialism tolerates some very
serious harms to certain individuals as long as they can be justified for the greater good.” P.
73. While this is true for classical utilitarian, a thoroughly consequentialist theory like negative
utilitarianism would say just the opposite (albeit with certain qualifications). See, e.g., Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward
N. Zalta ed., 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/consequentialism/
[https://perma.cc/3GBX-E3MT] (“[S]ome utilitarians claim that an act is morally wrong if
and only if its consequences contain more pain (or other disvalues) than an alternative, re-
gardless of positive values.”).
6. Notably, he writes that:
[T]he claims of states cannot all be conceived as simply the sum of the claims of the individu-
als in them. Some very important state interests are not by their nature additive in the
sense that the claims of states with larger populations automatically outweigh the claims
of states with smaller populations. If preservation of the state system is important, then,
for some state interests, population is irrelevant. For example, the interest of the state in
not being invaded, or in having the immunity of its diplomatic agents protected, is not a
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Since his view is a nonideal theory, neither does it require maximizing
consequentialism, where moral rightness depends only upon the best conse-
quences.7 Ratner rejects total consequentialism, where moral rightness de-
pends solely upon the total or aggregate net good in the consequences.8
Although Ratner stresses the importance of equality qua impartiality, his
rejection of total consequentialism may entail the rejection of equal consid-
eration, where the moral benefits to one person matter just as much as simi-
lar benefits to any other person.9
Despite ambiguities about the precise kind of consequentialism at work
in Ratner’s account, it is clear that rule consequentialism motivates how he
screens legal norms to determine their status as globally just—that is, as
leading to “certain states of affairs defined in terms of peace and human
rights” (p. 83). Yet Ratner’s motivation for choosing this particular set of
pillars—peace and human rights—remains underdeveloped. At times, he
seems to rely upon moral intuitions. He dismisses a number of rival stan-
dards in part because he finds them “normatively unappealing” (p. 98). But
he also appears to ground these pillars in the norms and concerns of inter-
national law. His argument in support of this latter strategy is as follows:
International law has moral significance, because legal norms and practices
are “informing” our notion of what is just (p. 6). Law is one of the several
sources that help “generate” our conception of morality (p. 6). If a value is
central to morality, then it will likely crop up in the domain of (interna-
tional) law, since law is one of the sources that informs our understanding of
morality (pp. 6–7). And if we believe that “what is morally required must be
in some sense feasible”—that is, if “ought implies can,” then international
law, wherein practical moral questions are routinely considered and decided,
may provide the “can” (p. 6).
Ratner seeks to contain consequentialism to governing the justice of
norms of international law and not to the justice of the pillars themselves.
function of the size of its population (even if we think the state is simply an instrument
of individual interests).
Pp. 86–87. Insofar as states have “moral standing” (albeit a standing predicated upon individ-
ual persons), it follows that Ratner’s consequentialism does not involve a simple tallying up of
aggregate utility. See pp. 85–87.
7. Thus, he reasons as follows:
I will not generally seek to, nor need I, argue . . . that my standard requires a particular
norm, i.e. that it passes scrutiny under the two pillars and no other rule would do so,
although at times I will make such a claim. Certainly those engaged in ideal theory might
wish to make such claims exclusively, endorsing only those rules would do the best job of
advancing peace without interfering with human rights. But as the goal of this project is
to appraise the norms we have, I need not show that they are the only ones that meet the
standard of justice, even as I will need to identify those that do not meet the standard and
suggest alternatives that do.
Pp. 84–85.
8. For Ratner’s discussion of additive interests, see pp. 86–87.
9. I take this particular delineation of classical utilitarian’s subclaims from Walter Sin-
nott-Armstrong’s entry on Consequentialism in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2016). See Sinnott-Armstong, supra note 5.
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Ratner asks “whether various rules or alternatives to them, if followed by the
actors to whom they are directed, would be reasonably expected to lead to
certain states of affairs defined in terms of peace and human rights” (p. 83).
But rule consequentialism leaks into the justification he offers for his criteria
for determining the justice of legal norms. As noted, Ratner writes:
The consequentialist reasoning places the preservation of interstate and in-
ternal peace as the first principle of global justice precisely because peace is
the linchpin to advancing the welfare and overall flourishing of individuals,
wherever situated. And the second pillar is based upon putting the individ-
ual’s basic rights first in situations where the advancement of peace may
conflict with those rights. (p. 96)
In this passage, the pillars of peace and basic human rights have moral sali-
ence because they are generally effective in realizing human welfare and
human flourishing. If this is the case, then the fundamental moral values in
his theory are human welfare and human flourishing, and the values of ad-
vancing peace and respecting basic human rights are consequentially derived
principles that instrumentally serve these fundamental moral values. This
gives rise to the possibility that such principles might yield to more funda-
mental moral concerns relating to the attainment of human welfare and
human flourishing. In this case, the pillars of peace and basic human rights
are useful heuristics, but their moral value goes no further than that.
Thus, a third principle might be required to test international legal
norms to determine the extent to which they promote the attainment of
human welfare and human flourishing—a proposition which Ratner rejects
by his dismissal of the possibility of a third, “economic welfare” pillar, since
his “sense is still that the other two are of a qualitatively higher level of
importance” (p. 65). Or it means the expansion of his list of basic human
rights to include rights that protect interests relating to human welfare and
human flourishing more fully than the limited set of human rights he con-
siders just under his theory. Part II explores the first option, namely, the
possibility of a third pillar of justice consequentially derived from the funda-
mental values of human welfare and flourishing. Focusing on the right to
development, Part III addresses the second option, namely, the potential ex-
pansion of Ratner’s list of human rights to include rights that protect these
fundamental values.
II. Thick Sovereignty, Thin Justice10
The Thin Justice of International Law offers a nonideal theory of global
justice. Ratner defines the concept of nonideal theory in the context of
global justice as one exhibiting the following properties: “[I]t assumes the
existence and durability of the state system as the dominant organizing po-
litical structure for the globe” (p. 4); it acknowledges the fact that states
10. This and the following Part of this Review draw on and adapt work previously
published in Patrick Macklem, The Sovereignty of Human Rights (2015).
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display differences in power (p. 4); and it factors in the “the role of institu-
tions in administering law” (p. 5). He writes that “[w]hile non-ideal theory
has a number of meanings, in this case I mean that my approach develops
and applies a standard of justice in a way that takes account of core realities
of international politics and the global system” (p. 4). According to Ratner,
then, something that is nonideal is something that is factually applicable, in
that a nonideal theory of justice will take into account conditions that actu-
ally occur in the international realm.
To illustrate, one of the legal norms that Ratner argues is just is the rule
that authorizes a colonized people to acquire sovereign statehood in the
name of self-determination.11 According to Ratner, as a factual matter, al-
though there were rebellions and wars in some decolonization projects, the
majority of efforts at decolonization did not lead to major conflict between
colonial powers and their colonies (p. 151). Even if one were to view these
projects as detracting from interstate and intrastate peace, the legal norm
authorizing them would be only prima facie unjust for failing to pass the
first pillar (p. 151). And although secession may result in a postcolonial state
that may well make “ethnic relations worse, because it simplifies intergroup
confrontations,” and authorize “lower-level ethnic tyrann[y],” secession rec-
tifies the denial of basic human rights of colonized peoples for which coloni-
alism is responsible—and other international legal norms work to seek to
prevent human rights violations in the future.12 In contrast, international
law’s ban on the use of force except in cases of self-defense promotes peace
by removing force as an interstate “policy option” and is conducive to post-
conflict intrastate peace (p. 107). The right to use force in self-defense fur-
thers peace through its deterrent effects on potential attackers.13
Ratner’s thin theory of global justice deems just a great many legal
norms that comprise the existing international legal order. This is not sim-
ply because of the fact that, of the thirty-two actual and hypothetical legal
norms that Ratner tests against his standard, only three appear to be clearly
unjust.14 The fact that the application of Ratner’s two standards to an exten-
sive number of positive international legal norms results in very few findings
of injustice, although striking, has little bearing on the legitimacy of his the-
ory. If the thin standard of global justice deems just a thick body of interna-
tional legal norms, then that is simply the outcome of the thin standard.
Ratner presents arguments as to a norm’s justice or injustice, and many of
11. See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 124 (Oct. 24, 1970). On state practice, see James Craw-
ford, The Creation of States in International Law 621–47 (2d ed. 2006).
12. P. 153 (alteration in original) (quoting Donald L. Horowitz, Self-Determination:
Politics, Philosophy, and Law, in Ethnicity and Group Rights 421, 437 (Ian Shapiro & Will
Kymlicka eds., 1997)); see pp. 152–57 (describing how secession can protect human rights and
international law operates to protect the human rights of colonized peoples).
13. P. 108. Ratner sees the second exception to the ban—force authorized by the Security
Council—as conditionally just only if resorting to it respects basic human rights. P. 110.
14. These are a (hypothetical) complete ban on secession, pp. 160–61; the Montevideo
criteria of statehood, pp. 187–88; and a prohibition of nonauthorized humanitarian interven-
tion, pp. 300–01.
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the conclusions he reaches are close calls, and conditional on the presence of
additional factors.15 And he, of course, does not present his conclusions re-
garding the justice of international legal norms as the last say on the matter.
Scholars disagree, for example, on the justice of the doctrine of uti possidetis,
where internal administrative boundaries serve as the borders of a new state
in the event of secession.16 Ratner would comprehend at least some of these
disagreements as contestation over the justice of such a role and advocate
that they be framed  by the extent to which they defend the legal norm in
terms that relate to its role in the promotion of interstate and intrastate
peace and respect for human rights.
But the thick nature of the just international legal order that the applica-
tion of the two pillars produces is also due to the fact that the legal norms
that constitute the international legal entitlement of sovereignty are held
constant in the calculus. “[T]heories of global justice,” according to Ratner,
“need to accept states both morally and pragmatically,” as “[t]he state sys-
tem appears to be a fixed attribute of the international [legal] order” (p. 86).
Ratner does test the justice of the criteria for statehood and finds them
wanting because they do not include a criterion of respecting basic human
rights (p. 188); the principle of sovereign equality, the absence of which
would result in powerful states dominating weaker states and which does not
compromise the obligation of states to respect human rights (pp. 197–200);
and the right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources, which avoids
interstate conflict over whose resources belong to whom and does not inter-
fere with the enjoyment of basic human rights (pp. 317–18). But sovereignty
itself, as a legal entitlement that the international legal order distributes to
some geographically concentrated collectivities in the world and not others,
is not interrogated in terms of its relationship to peace and human rights.
This distribution—its origins, the episodic recalibrations to which it is sub-
ject, and its distributional consequences—forms the heart of our interna-
tional legal order; it is the primary way by which international law provides
legal order to global politics. Treating it as “a fixed attribute of the interna-
tional [legal] order” means that questions relating to the justice of this dis-
tribution remain outside the normative sphere of global justice (p. 86).
One such question relates to the relationship between a system of sover-
eign states and global economic inequality. A growing number of political
theorists have argued that distributive justice ought not to be confined
within state boundaries but instead should be conceived of globally. Natu-
rally, these scholars have differed as to what counts as a globally just distri-
bution. According to Charles Beitz, distributive justice requires that global
socioeconomic inequalities be arranged so that the greatest benefit accrues
to the least advantaged,17 while Simon Caney defends a similar view that
15. See, e.g., pp. 317–18.
16. See pp. 176–79.
17. Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (1979); see
also Tan, supra note 3, at 60–61 (“[A] just global distributive scheme would be one which
meets [Rawls’s] second principle of justiceequality of opportunity and the regulation of global
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includes “subsistence rights, a principle of global equality of opportunity,
rules of fair play, and a commitment to prioritizing the least advantaged.”18
Hillel Steiner goes further, suggesting that global distributive justice necessi-
tates that an equal portion of the world’s natural resources be made available
to all.19
Theorists have also diverged on the question of to whom global justice
should apply. Some thinkers, endorsing the cosmopolitan ideal that morality
is grounded in individual agents, argue that a just distribution of resources is
one that includes all citizens of the world.20 For others, it is nations or peo-
ples that make up the proper subjects of global justice.21 Others still see
global justice as applying primarily to states. Brian Barry, for instance, re-
jects the claim that states are wholly responsible for the poverty within their
midst and instead argues for global redistributive measures that can reduce
interstate disparities of wealth and resources.22
Despite these differences, much of this scholarship rests on the proposi-
tion that natural, geographical, and social contingencies underpinning
global poverty—such as one’s home state, its location, and its resources—
are arbitrary from a moral point of view. If one person is born into an
impoverished state in Africa, say, while another is born into a developed
state in Western Europe, the geographical dissimilarity between the two may
explain the poverty of the former and the relative affluence of the latter, but
it does not justify it.23 The initial distribution may not be morally wrong in
itself. However, justice enters the picture because of the arbitrariness in their
respective situations: the fact that one state happens to be resource rich does
not justify it in excluding others from its resources.24
Accompanying these claims are arguments that there are important sim-
ilarities between domestic and global economic inequality, such that “the
two realms are sufficiently similar that whatever principles of justice we are
equality by the difference principle . . . [and] would keep the plight of the worst-off individuals
(globally situated) firmly in its sight.”); Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights,
Ethics & Int’l Aff., March 2005, at 4–7.
18. Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory 264 (2005).
19. Hillel Steiner, An Essay on Rights (1994).
20. See, e.g., Beitz, supra note 17, at 127–69; see also Caney, supra note 18, at 102–41;
Darrel Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice 30–67 (2002); Thomas W. Pogge, Realiz-
ing Rawls 211–40 (1989). For an illuminating analysis of how international legal scholarship
and political theorists conceptualize cosmopolitanism, see Başak Çali, On Legal Cosmopolitan-
ism: Divergences in Political Theory and International Law, 19 Leiden J. Int’l L. 1149 (2006)
(book review).
21. See, e.g., John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999).
22. Brian Barry, Do Countries Have Moral Obligations? The Case of World Poverty, in 2
The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 25 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1981).
23. See Goodin, supra note 3, at 682–87; David A.J. Richards, International Distributive
Justice, in Ethics, Economics, and the Law 275 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1982).
24. See Beitz, supra note 17, at 136–43. For discussion, see Álvaro de Vita, Inequality and
Poverty in Global Perspective, in Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes
What to the Very Poor? 103, 120–22 (Thomas Pogge ed., 2007).
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prepared to acknowledge in the domestic case, we should be prepared to
acknowledge in the international case as well.”25 On certain conceptions of
justice, of course, poverty and economic inequality should not necessarily be
attended to in domestic political communities.26 But other theorists argue
that the very same principles of justice that ground obligations to attend to
poverty within a political community also ground obligations to attend to
global poverty. As John Rawls explains, a political community is “a system of
cooperation designed to advance the good of those taking part in it.”27 Ac-
cordingly, so long as justice requires attending to economic inequalities in a
political community, then justice ought to make a parallel demand in the
international realm, since this realm contains comparable relations of mu-
tual reciprocity and social cooperation. Rawls himself did not believe that
the international community manifests the requisite degree of social cooper-
ation to ground an obligation to address global poverty.28 Instead, he recog-
nized a “duty of assistance” to ensure that states possess the capacity to
operate in accordance with a public conception of justice.29
The above approaches to global wealth redistribution are beset by two
challenges. First, in the words of Kok-Chor Tan, proponents of the view
must “show how the aspiration for justice without borders can be reconciled
with what seems to be a basic moral fact that people may, and are indeed
obliged to, give special concern to their compatriots.”30 This call to action
echoes H.L.A. Hart’s distinction between special rights, which “arise out of
special transactions between individuals or out of some special relationship
in which they stand to each other,” and general rights, “which all men capa-
ble of choice have.”31 Indeed, critics have argued that the ideal of global
justice necessarily contradicts the fact that we owe special duties and obliga-
tions to members of our own political community, since the conditions that
give rise to these special obligations simply fail to arise within the interna-
tional realm.
Such an argument has been raised by Thomas Nagel. Although he ad-
mits that we have a duty to provide basic humanitarian assistance to those in
25. Beitz, supra note 17, at 200.
26. See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974).
27. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 4 (rev. ed. 1999).
28. See Rawls, supra note 21, § 16.2, at 118–19.
29. See id. § 15, at 105–13; cf. Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Extra Rempublicam Nulla
Justitia?, 34 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 147 (2006) (suggesting that the existence of common institu-
tions and collective interdependence across state borders calls for a weak form of international
distributive justice).
30. Tan, supra note 3, at 136. Tan advances a version of cosmopolitan distributive justice
that accommodates but limits patriotic concerns. See id. But see Samuel Scheffler, Bounda-
ries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought 111
(2001) (distinguishing between cosmopolitanism as a “doctrine about culture” and cosmopoli-
tanism as a “doctrine about justice”). Scheffler seeks to defend a theory of cosmopolitanism
that takes seriously the particular ties and associative relationships that arise in particular com-
munities of value. See id.
31. H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 Phil. Rev. 175, 183, 188 (1955).
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need in foreign countries, he maintains that any further obligations promot-
ing distributive justice should vest in, and be owed to, members of political
communities constituted as states.32 For Nagel, it is the fact that “we are both
putative joint authors of the coercively imposed system, and subject to its
norms . . . that creates the special presumption against arbitrary inequalities
in our treatment by the system.”33 He further argues that international insti-
tutions lack coercive power putatively delegated by individuals whose lives
they affect, which means that “the responsibility of those institutions toward
individuals is filtered through the states that represent and bear primary
responsibility for those individuals.”34
Andrea Sangiovanni takes a different approach, emphasizing not the
state’s potential power to coerce, but the potential for reciprocity that exists
where citizens of a state mutually provide “collective goods necessary to pro-
tect [them] from physical attack” which in turn can help “maintain and
reproduce a stable system of property rights and entitlements.”35 In his view,
“[w]e owe obligations of egalitarian reciprocity to fellow citizens and re-
sidents in the state, who provide us with the basic conditions and guarantees
necessary to develop and act on a plan of life, but not to noncitizens, who do
not.”36 Although the global sphere does exhibit institutionally mediated rela-
tionships of reciprocity, the nature and character of these relationships yield
different principles of justice “in both form and content than those appro-
priate at the domestic level.”37 Sangiovanni thus rejects the possibility that
international reciprocal relationships can ground an obligation to address
global economic inequality.
Yet both the advocates and critics of global wealth redistribution tend to
overlook the normative significance of the relationship between the interna-
tional legal order and the distributive injustice of global poverty.38 It is no
32. Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 113 (2005).
33. Id. at 128–29. For Michael Blake, it is the fact that the state restricts the autonomy of
citizens that generates a concern for distributive justice. See Michael Blake, Distributive Justice,
State Coercion, and Autonomy, 30 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 257 (2001). For critique of Blake’s view,
see Arash Abizadeh, Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and Coercion: On the Scope (Not Site) of
Distributive Justice, 35 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 318, 348–50 (2007). For criticism of Nagel’s view, see
Chris Armstrong, Coercion, Reciprocity, and Equality Beyond the State, 40 J. Soc. Phil. 297
(2009); and A.J. Julius, Nagel’s Atlas, 34 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 176 (2006).
34. Nagel, supra note 32, at 138.
35. Andrea Sangiovanni, Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State, 35 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3,
19–20 (2007).
36. Id. at 20; see also 2 Brian Barry, Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective, in
Liberty and Justice: Essays in Political Theory 182 (2d ed. 1991).
37. Sangiovanni, supra note 35, at 35. For critiques, see Abizadeh, supra note 33, at
336–37, and Armstrong, supra note 33, at 304–12.
38. One significant exception lies in the work of Kok-Chor Tan, who weds an interna-
tional institutional approach to distributive justice with luck egalitarianism, rendering morally
relevant the fact “that there is a global social arrangement—consisting of specific institutional
entities, and institutionally entrenched or enforced social and legal norms and expectations—
that has the effect of rendering random facts about persons and the natural world into actual
social inequalities.” Kok-Chor Tan, Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site, Ground,
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doubt true that poverty often arises out of morally arbitrary contingencies,
such as the place of one’s origin. Yet the poverty experienced by a person
born in, say, Chad, is not simply a matter of natural, geographical, and so-
cial contingency. It is also a function of the fact that she was born into a
particular legal jurisdiction, which the international legal community has
both recognized and vested with sovereignty over people and territory.
International law relies on sovereignty, as a legal entitlement, to bring
legal order to global politics. Sovereignty has been defended in terms of a
need “for a presumptive monopoly of the last word on public order in any
given territory.”39 Moreover, sovereignty in the context of international law
also possesses a measure of normative purchase because, for instance, people
can and do flourish when they are organized into particular political com-
munities and accordingly generate a complex set of interests that merit pro-
tection.40 But relying on sovereignty to organize global politics into an
international legal order also extends international legal validity to certain
natural, geographical, and social—yet morally arbitrary—contingencies that
locate us in the world. The degree to which a sovereign state can address
poverty in its midst depends in no small measure on its location, bounda-
ries, and resources—variables whose limits and possibilities are determined
by the nature and extent of that state’s sovereign powers.
In addition, international law also treats states as juridically equal legal
actors, such that they possess identical international legal rights and are
equal in their formal capacity to exercise them.41 Ratner does indeed assess
the justice of the principle of sovereign equality, holding it just because of
how it promotes interstate and intrastate peace and its agnostic effect on
respecting human rights (pp. 197–200). But since the distribution of sover-
eignty is not subject to the critical gaze of his two normative criteria for a
globally just international legal order, Ratner excludes from examination the
following nonideal fact: that because of international law’s foundational
commitment to formal equality of states, the substantive equality of states
plays a marginal role within the normative architecture of the international
legal order. Questions of substantive equality are ultimately domesticated,
and Scope of Equality 158 (2012). Tan focuses specifically on “global norms (such as those
governing sovereignty, resource ownership, territorial rights), economic practices (such as
trade laws, intellectual property rights laws), and international laws and principles (such as
those regulating movement of persons across borders).” Id. at 151–58.
39. See Roth, supra note 4, at 7.
40. See Rogers M. Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of
Political Membership 8–9 (2003) (arguing that because humanity has yet to devise ways
that people can flourish without being organized into particular political communities, we
should attach moral weight to what is essential for particular communities to survive).
41. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1 (“The Organization is based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members.”); Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 4, Dec.
26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (“States are juridically equal, enjoy the same rights,
and have equal capacity in their exercise. The rights of each one do not depend upon the
power which it possesses to assure its exercise, but upon the simple fact of its existence as a
person under international law.”).
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since international law treats its potential normative significance as a domes-
tic question of distributive justice among citizens, subject to the vagaries of
domestic political contestation. By relegating substantive equality norms to
the domestic realm, international law further emphasizes the natural, geo-
graphical, and social contingencies that contribute to global poverty. To re-
turn to our previous example, international law conceives of the people of
Chad as forming a sovereign state; it vests them with only those meager
resources found within their territory; and, crucially, it prevents them from
accessing resources elsewhere, imposing stiff barriers in the paths of those
hoping to emigrate to a better life.42 A pillar that tests legal norms in terms
of their proximity to human welfare and human flourishing would do much
to mitigate some of these adverse consequences of the distribution of sover-
eignty in international law.
III. A Political Conception of Human Rights
Consistent with a nonideal account, Ratner justifies his first pillar of
global justice—interstate and intrastate peace, where “peace” denotes the
absence of violence—via its foundational status within the domain of inter-
national law.43 But, as noted, he also stresses the importance of peace to
human welfare and flourishing (pp. 64, 67, 70). For this reason, he seems to
view peace as a largely instrumental value, in that it reliably, but not neces-
sarily, brings about a variety of desired outcomes (p. 66). The qualification
“but not necessarily” is significant. According to Ratner, although peace is
often desirable, it alone is not enough to ground a standard of global justice,
insofar as “[c]onsequentialism tolerates some very serious harms to certain
individuals as long as they can be justified for the greater good.”44 His worry,
then, is that this pillar could justify peace obtained at an extremely high cost
(p. 73). This anxiety leads him to introduce his second pillar of global jus-
tice: respect for basic human rights. Ratner claims that “[a] just outcome
42. Joseph Carens recognizes this problem when he states:
The modern state system organizes the world so that all of the inhabited land is divided
up among (putatively) sovereign states who possess exclusive authority over what goes on
within the territories they govern, including the right to control and limit entry to their
territories.
. . . Because the state system assigns people to states, states collectively have a re-
sponsibility to help those for whom this assignment is disastrous.
Joseph H. Carens, The Ethics of Immigration 196 (2013). Carens argues that more porous
borders would mitigate some of these morally arbitrary determinants. See Joseph H. Carens,
Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, in Theorizing Citizenship 229 (Ronald
Beiner ed., 1995).
43. Pp. 65–66. Ratner explains that his view “does not regard peace as the absence of
conflict, where the lion lies down with the lamb.” P. 66.
44. P. 73. This claim is actually not entirely true. For instance, the consequentialist the-
ory of negative utilitarianism says that (morally prescribed) gains in utility can never be at the
expense of less-well-off persons. See Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 5. If Ratner had applied
this theory, the above concern would be averted without resorting to (somewhat ad hoc)
deontological reasoning.
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must also be one that respects certain fundamental values regarding the way
we treat people—that we, and thus the law, must treat individuals the right
way, with a certain degree of basic respect” (p. 73). Insofar as the first pillar
fails to necessarily entail such respect, Ratner introduces respect for human
rights. In delineating his set of basic human rights, he endorses a political
conception of human rights, such that they should be grounded in actual
state practice (p. 75).
In recent years, political accounts of international human rights have
garnered attention in international political theory. Unlike most moral ap-
proaches, which focus on universal features of our common humanity,45 po-
litical conceptions define the nature of human rights in terms of their
practical function in global political discourse. Global human rights dis-
course is a social practice whose participants invoke or rely on human rights
as reasons for certain kinds of actions in certain circumstances. What this
practice reveals is that human rights protect urgent individual interests
against certain predictable dangers associated with the exercise of sovereign
power. States have a primary obligation to protect urgent interests of indi-
viduals over whom they exercise sovereign power, but external actors, such
as other states and international institutions, have secondary obligations to
secure protection when a state fails to live up to its responsibility.46 “To say
that something is a human right,” in Beitz’s view, “is to say that social insti-
tutions that fail to protect the right are defective—they fall short of meeting
conditions that anyone would reasonably expect them to satisfy—and that
international efforts to aid or promote reform are legitimate and in some
cases may be morally required.”47
How does one sift through the global practice of human rights to deter-
mine which practices are sufficiently important objectives of global political
life to attract the normative value we attach to human rights? Joseph Raz
45. E.g., Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice 10 (2d
ed. 2003) (“Human rights are, literally, the rights that one has simply because one is a human
being.”); James Griffin, On Human Rights 48 (2008) (“Human rights . . . must be univer-
sal, because they are possessed by human agents simply in virtue of their normative agency.”);
A. John Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations 185
(2001) (“[H]uman rights are rights possessed by all human beings (at all times and in all
places), simply in virtue of their humanity.”); John Tasioulas, The Moral Reality of Human
Rights, in Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very
Poor?, supra note 24, at 75, 76 (“[H]uman rights are moral entitlements possessed by all
simply in virtue of their humanity.”).
46. See Beitz, supra note 3, at 107–17. Rawls also defines the functional role of interna-
tional human rights in terms of justifying interference in the internal affairs of a state. See
Rawls, supra note 21, at 79 (stating that human rights “restrict the justifying reasons for war
and its conduct” and “specify limits to a regime’s internal autonomy”). But as Beitz points out,
Rawls does not also see human rights as justifying external assistance in their realization.
Charles R. Beitz, Human Rights and the Law of Peoples, in The Ethics of Assistance 193, 203
(Deen K. Chatterjee ed., 2004) [hereinafter Beitz, Law of Peoples]. Beitz, in contrast, includes
external assistance in his definition of the functional role of human rights, which leads him to
define the right to an adequate standard of living as mandating global wealth redistribution.
See id. at 205–10.
47. Beitz, Law of Peoples, supra note 46, at 210.
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defends a set of selection criteria that are empirical and variable, resting on
whether, in the circumstances, external interference in the domestic affairs
of a state is normatively justifiable, which in turn rests on contingencies
specific to the state in question and the current nature of the international
legal order.48 Joshua Cohen argues that human rights, properly understood,
are those that relate to “an idea of membership or inclusion in an organized
political society, and not on a deeper outlook about the proper conduct of a
good or righteous life.”49 Michael Ignatieff offers a minimalist account of
human rights, validating practices of intervention in the name of human
rights—practices that relate to “the elemental priority of all human rights
activism: to stop torture, beatings, killings, rape, and assault and to improve,
as best we can, the security of ordinary people.”50 Ratner’s selection criteria,
building on the work of Henry Shue and Beitz, are based on the following
definition: “Human rights are individual entitlements, creating requirements
on other actors, for protection from a set of ‘standard threats,’ which are
‘predictable dangers . . . to which [individuals] are vulnerable under typical
circumstances of life in a modern world order composed of states.’ ”51 His
selection criteria yield the following list of human rights that require respect:
rights to physical security, nondiscrimination rights, freedom to form a fam-
ily, freedom of expression and religion, freedom from alien rule, rights of
representative government, a right to primary education, and a right to a
safe workplace (p. 76).
If the goal is to specify the political role that human rights play in the
international legal order as a descriptive matter, then it makes eminent sense
to attend to how they motivate and justify the actions of political actors in
the international arena. But relying on practice to identify the normative
dimensions of human rights—that is, the role they should play in the inter-
national arena—risks conflating fact and norm, and potentially drains
human rights of their capacity to act as instruments of critique of existing
practices. Determining the extent to which a human right should act in this
way requires accounting for its normative purpose, and it makes little sense
to locate such an account in existing practice.
This also immediately raises problems associated with originalism. Po-
litical conceptions of human rights that focus on practice require attributing
significance to the intentions of political actors producing and reproducing
the practice at hand. A political conception gives credence to the intent of
participants in the practice of human rights because it identifies the nature
of human rights by reference to the actions of those involved in the practices
48. See Joseph Raz, Human Rights Without Foundations, in The Philosophy of Inter-
national Law 321, 327–37 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010).
49. Joshua Cohen, Is There a Human Right to Democracy?, in The Egalitarian Con-
science: Essays in Honour of G.A. Cohen 226, 237 (Christine Sypnowich ed., 2006).
50. Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry 173 (Amy Gut-
mann ed., 2001).
51. P. 74 (first quoting Beitz, supra note 3, at 109 (alteration in original); and then
quoting Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy 17
(2d ed. 1996)).
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that exemplify their discursive role in global politics. Ascribing meaning to
such actions requires determinations of the intentions, aims, and objectives
of those who engage in them. A political conception, in other words, attrib-
utes relevance to the intent of participants in the practice of human rights
because the meaning of an action cannot be gleaned without a grasp of the
intent behind it. The nature of the human rights that comprise the field,
according to this perspective, rests in no small measure on what political
actors intend to accomplish when they engage in the practice of human
rights.
A focus on the original intent of those who invoke human rights as
reasons for intervention in the internal jurisdiction of states assists in distin-
guishing political conceptions of human rights from moral accounts that
seek to locate their nature in essential properties of what it means to be
human. But although reliance on originalism might bolster the plausibility
of political accounts, in the eyes of those otherwise tempted by the allure of
natural law that moral accounts implicitly rely on, it exposes what they must
repress to acquire explanatory power. Ascertaining the intent of those re-
sponsible for the enactment of a legal norm is a thoroughly interpretive
enterprise that must specify a plausible method of discerning intent, distin-
guish actual intentions from stated intentions, identify which actors count as
framers, assume that each actor was motivated by a single objective or assign
weights to her multiple objectives, specify how much weight is to be given to
their intentions in relation to the intentions of those whom they represent,
and sift through countless, competing political motivations of a multiplicity
of international actors.52
Supplementing his political conception of human rights, Ratner claims
that human rights are also moral concepts: “I thus take human rights to be a
moral concept even as we give that concept some content by reference to its
political role and legal codification in the world” (p. 74). This claim rests on
his ability to defend the normative value of his selection criteria that deter-
mine which practices are sufficiently important objectives of global political
life to attract the normative value we attach to human rights. Such a defense
52. One way to address some of these concerns is to narrow the class of political actors
whose practice defines a human right. Jean Cohen, for example, focuses on “the politics of
actors who invoke the international documents and rely on strong moral arguments when
declaring and claiming their own rights vis-à-vis the exercise of the public power first and
foremost of their own state.” Jean L. Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty: Rethinking
Legality, Legitimacy, and Constitutionalism 164 (2012). This enables Cohen to box out
the politics of actors who invoke the discourse of human rights in the context of “the enforce-
ment model that humanitarian intervention articulates regarding grave humanitarian crises or
grave rights violations” from “the heart of the international human rights ‘regime.’ ” Id. at 194.
For an illuminating account of international human rights that derive their normativity from
the practices of feminist human rights activists “working to make marginalized people and
marginalizing structures visible,” see Brooke A. Ackerly, Universal Human Rights in a
World of Difference 16 (2008). For a critique of various methods of identifying the practice
of human rights and its practitioners and a proposal that one needs to construct an “idealised
practitioner” for this task, see David Jason Karp, The Location of International Practices: What
Is Human Rights Practice?, 39 Rev. Int’l Stud. 969, 971 (2013).
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must be mounted independently of the global practice of human rights,
which only establishes their factual existence as reasons for certain kinds of
actions in certain circumstances, and not why they should be reasons for
such actions.
Ratner relies on Beitz and Shue for the heavy normative lifting here, and
both scholars offer eloquent accounts of the normativity of their selection
criteria.53 But, like Beitz and Shue, Ratner sees international legal codifica-
tion of human rights as secondary to this task. According to Ratner, “the
codification of some claimed rights into legal form is neither necessary nor
sufficient for something to be a human right” (p. 74). Selection criteria op-
erate to determine whether a human right in international law possesses the
requisite normativity to be an instrument of global justice (and whether the
absence of a positive international human right is an instance of global in-
justice). But if one’s selection criteria generate a list of human rights that is
narrower than those that exist in international law, as in the case of Ratner’s
selection criteria, they are not normative accounts of international human
rights law. They are normative critiques of international human rights law.
This fits with a broader project of sifting through positive international legal
norms to determine their proximity to a just international legal order. But if
the task is instead to determine the legal functions that human rights might
play in mitigating some of the adverse consequence of the deployment of
sovereignty to constitute global politics into an international legal order,
then those functions may only be coincidentally related to political practice
or the normativity of one’s selection criteria. And if peace and human rights
are the only pillars consequentially derived from the fundamental values of
human welfare and flourishing, then one’s selection criteria should include
rights that protect interests associated with these values.
One international human right that protects interests associated with
human welfare and human flourishing is the right to development. Its codi-
fication in the UN Declaration on the Right to Development,54 as well as its
enshrinement in both the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights,55 for example, calls on states to exercise external sovereign power to
address economic inequality beyond their boundaries. The Declaration on
the Right to Development refers to the right to development as “an inaliena-
ble human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are
entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural
and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental free-
doms can be fully realized.”56 It defines the right as an entitlement to “a
53. Beitz, supra note 3, at 48–95; Shue, supra note 51, at 109.
54. G.A. Res. 41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986).
55. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, adopted and opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, adopted and opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
56. G.A. Res. 41/128, supra note 54, art. 1, ¶ 1.
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comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process.”57 It compre-
hends the alleviation of poverty as an objective of development, by referring
to development as aiming “at the constant improvement of the well-being of
the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free
and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of
benefits resulting therefrom.”58
The Declaration on the Right to Development further comprehends the
right to development as imposing negative and positive obligations on both
the internal and external exercise of sovereign power.59 The internal dimen-
sions of the right require states to exercise their sovereign power over re-
sources and revenues in ways that promote development for the benefit of
its population. Article 2(3) of the Declaration, for example, imposes on
states “the duty to formulate appropriate national development policies.”60
Article 8 requires states to undertake “at the national level, all necessary
measures for the realization of the right to development.”61 The external
dimensions of the right speak to the exercise of sovereign power in the inter-
national arena. Article 3(1), for example, imposes positive obligations on
states to create “international conditions favourable to the realization of the
right to development.”62 Article 4(1) provides that states are under an indi-
vidual and collective obligation “to formulate international development
policies with a view to facilitating the full realization of the right to develop-
ment.”63 Other articles refer to duties of international cooperation and assis-
tance, further specifying the external dimensions of the right.64
The Declaration on the Right to Development thus verifies the interna-
tional legal existence of the right to development and validates its interna-
tional legal character as a human right. The Declaration defines
development in comprehensive and participatory terms and comprehends
development as requiring the alleviation of poverty. And it imposes internal
obligations on all states to promote development for the benefit of their
respective populations and imposes external obligations on states to facilitate
development beyond their borders.
But the right to development, despite its codification in international
legal instruments, likely does not manifest the requisite political practice to
57. Id. annex, ¶ 2.
58. Id.
59. See Margot E. Salomon, Legal Cosmopolitanism and the Normative Contribution of the
Right to Development, in Implementing the Right to Development: The Role of Inter-
national Law 17 (Stephen P. Marks ed., 2008).
60. G.A. Res. 41/128, supra note 54, art. 2, ¶ 3.
61. Id. art. 8, ¶ 1.
62. Id. art. 3, ¶ 1.
63. Id. art. 4, ¶ 1.
64. Id. art. 3, ¶ 3; id. art. 4, ¶ 2. For a similar, more detailed, interpretation of the
Declaration, see Anne Orford, Globalization and the Right to Development, in Peoples’ Rights
127, 135–45 (Philip Alston ed., 2001).
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qualify, under a political conception of human rights, as a reason that re-
quires international legal actors to take measures to reduce global economic
inequality. To put it bluntly, the role that the right to development plays in
global human rights discourse is fairly minimal. And, even if political prac-
tice regarding its deployment was sufficiently robust to constitute it as a
reason validating the exercise of external sovereign power, it would still need
to be shown that the right to development protects urgent individual inter-
ests against certain predictable dangers associated with the exercise of sover-
eign power.65 This might be the case with respect to the exercise of internal
sovereign power, but one would be hard-pressed to make the case that the
exercise of external sovereign power threatens urgent interests associated
with the right to development. This is because, except in exceptional circum-
stances, the exercise of external sovereign power does not directly affect such
interests. Global economic inequality, generally speaking, is not a function
of the exercise of sovereign power in the international legal arena.66 Instead,
the right to development performs a normative function relatively distinct
from political practice and political conceptions of human rights. It speaks
to adverse consequences that flow from the distribution of sovereignty that
international law performs to bring international legal order to global polit-
ics. And if the pillar of respect for basic human rights is consequentially
derived from the fundamental moral values of human welfare and human
flourishing, then the right to development merits inclusion in the list of
human rights designed to secure these values.
Conclusion
The Thin Justice of International Law offers a timely, comprehensive, and
theoretically rich interdisciplinary theory of international law’s relationship
with global justice. It is a major contribution to the burgeoning literature on
global justice, with a fine eye to legal detail and institutional design, rich
with insight into normative dimensions of international legal rules and the
extent to which they relate to interstate and intrastate peace and respect for
human rights. The book is an invaluable inquiry into whether and how such
legal norms serve the cause of global justice. It bridges international legal
theory with moral and political theory with a standard of global justice
grounded both in nonideal and ideal terms that sorts actual legal norms in
terms of their consequences on peace and human rights—criteria immanent
in our existing international legal system but also demanded by abstract
conditions of global justice.
This Review has explored three features of The Thin Justice of Interna-
tional Law: its commitment to rule consequentialism, its treatment of the
65. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
66. An important exception is international economic legal norms that foster liberaliza-
tion of trade and investment, which have the potential, at least to exacerbate global economic
inequality, which Ratner acknowledges. See pp. 323–27.
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state system as a fixed attribute of our international legal order, and its em-
brace of a political conception of human rights. Its commitment to rule
consequentialism leads to the possibility that its two pillars of global jus-
tice—interstate and intrastate peace and respect for human rights—them-
selves are rules consequentially derived from more fundamental moral
values of human welfare and human dignity. If this is the case, then the
fundamental moral values in Ratner’s theory are human welfare and human
flourishing, and the values of advancing peace and respecting basic human
rights are consequentially derived principles that instrumentally serve these
fundamental moral values. This gives rise to the possibility that such princi-
ples might give way to more fundamental moral concerns relating to the
attainment of human welfare and human flourishing, in which case the pil-
lars of peace and basic human rights are not necessarily exclusive criteria of
just legal norms. Another pillar—one directly that tests the justice of legal
norms in terms of their proximity to human welfare—comprises another
part of a normative inquiry of international law’s relationship to global
justice.
The second feature of The Thin Justice of International Law concerns its
acceptance of the distribution of sovereignty that international law performs
to organize global politics into an international legal order, resulting in a
thick conception of a just international legal system. The distribution of sov-
ereignty—its origins, the episodic recalibrations to which it is subject, espe-
cially during and after times of war, and its distributional consequences—is
treated as a fixed attribute of the international legal order. Questions that
relate to the justice of this distribution remain outside the normative sphere
of global justice. One such question concerns the relationship between a
system of sovereign states and global economic inequality. The natural, geo-
graphical, and social contingencies that contribute to global economic ine-
quality—such as the state into which one is born, its location, and its
resources—are morally arbitrary determinants of one’s station in life. But
such circumstances are not simply the function of natural, social, and geo-
graphical contingencies. One’s station in life is also a product of being born
in a legal jurisdiction recognized by international law as vested with sover-
eignty over its people and territory, and the capacity of a sovereign state in
its midst is no small measure a function of its location, boundaries, and
resources. These are variables whose limits and possibilities are determined
by the distribution of sovereignty in international law, which thus merits
normative scrutiny to the extent that the global economic inequality that
this distribution validates frustrates the moral values of human welfare and
human flourishing.
The third feature of The Thin Justice of International Law is its endorse-
ment of a political conception of those human rights that constitute its sec-
ond pillar of global justice. On this conception, human rights protect urgent
individual interests against predicable dangers associated with the exercise of
sovereign power. They do not protect urgent interests from the adverse con-
sequences of the distribution of sovereignty performed by international law
in its aspiration to organize global politics into an international legal order.
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But if respect for human rights is consequentially derived from more funda-
mental values that relate to human welfare and human flourishing, these
values are not only threatened by the exercise of sovereign power. They are
also threatened by the very distribution of sovereign power. Human rights
that speak to mitigate some of these consequences—the right to develop-
ment in particular—seek to protect interests associated with human welfare
and human flourishing in the face of both the distribution and exercise of
sovereign power, and thus merit recognition on the list of human rights that
a theory should seek to instantiate as a matter of global justice.
